Abstract-This work addresses secrecy with distributed systems in mind. We consider an adversary who wishes to attack a system and find the optimal communication and use of secret key to share information in such a system. Instead of measuring secrecy by "equivocation," we define a value function for the system, based on the actions of the system and the adversary, and set out to design a system that maximizes the average value obtained against the worst adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a situation where an adversary attempts to disrupt a distributed system. The adversary may be attempting to jam communications, overload a power grid, or counter a miliary attack. We investigate the nature of the communication used to coordinate the system. How should the system use secret key resources to establish coordinated behavior? How should the system disseminate information about availability of power in a power grid, frequency channels or network routes used for communication, or military strategy adjustments. This work establishes a new approach for defining secrecy in distributed systems.
The theoretical investigation of secret communication was formalized by Claude Shannon as a fundamental component of his broad theory of communication. In his 1949 paper, "Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems" [1] , Shannon showed among other things that truly secret communication over a public channel cannot be achieved with less secret key than is needed for a Vernam cipher using a one-time pad. The Vernam cipher utilizes shared secret key to hide the message via a bit-wise exclusive-or operation. This produces a transmitted signal that is independent of the message if the key is an independent sequence of random bits, as with the one-time pad. To formalize the study of secret communication, Shannon assumed that an eavesdropper knows everything about the encryption system except the secret key. Furthermore, he allowed the eavesdropper to use unlimited computational resources to break the encryption. These assumptions lay foundation for strong statements about secrecy. However, the most famous result from this work is that perfect secrecy, where the ciphertext (transmission) reveals nothing about the plaintext (message), requires a secret key with as much entropy as the message itself.
Exchanging such large secret keys for perfect secrecy can be unrealistic. Thus, the field has advanced through a number of different compromises: computational limits on the eavesdropper; noisy public channels for communication; metrics for partial secrecy; etc.
Practical modern applications of cryptography have been mostly based on secrecy that is computationally difficult to discover. Diffie and Hellman introduced in [2] the use of asymmetric keys for cipher systems and trapdoor functions, which are easy to compute but hard to invert, to keep the keys secret. Systems of this type maintain secrecy as long as the trapdoor function is not inverted for the particular key used. To date, complexity theory has yet to provide certificates of proof that commonly used encryption systems are computationally difficult to break. Nevertheless, in practice such systems have proven extremely useful.
Mathematical proofs of secrecy along the lines of Shannon have remained an active area of research. Information theoretic secrecy may someday be a cost effective and desirable framework for encryption if an inexpensive method for secret key exchange is developed, which may come about through the use of quantum channels as pioneered by Bennett and Brassard [3] . Additionally, quantum computing may bring security risks to the state-of-the-art cryptographic systems that don't provide information theoretic secrecy. However, perhaps more importantly, the study of information theoretic secrecy builds a foundation of precise problems, with answers that provide important insights into the nature of secret communication. These insights may be used to shape the development of practical systems for encryption in complex settings.
Since Shannon, various settings have been explored. The wire-tap channel is a setting introduced by Wyner [4] , where the intended receiver and an eavesdropper each get different noisy versions of the transmitted signal. If the eavesdropper has a noisier view of the signal than the intended receiver, then perfect secrecy can be achieved without the use of a secret key, although a low rate of communication might be required. This has inspired related work on physical layer security. Some settings allow for correlated (but not identically equal) measurements to be made by the various participants in consideration, from which they can derive a secret key or make inferences about the information source. See, for example, [5] .
Even in the simplest of settings, a general theory of secrecy must address partial secrecy. The following section discusses this topic, which is the focus of this work.
II. PARTIAL SECRECY
Most work on information theoretic security, including Shannon's [1] and Wyner's [4] , address the concept of imperfect or partial secrecy. A widely used metric of partial secrecy is equivocation. The term "equivocation" was used in an information theory context as early as Shannon's 1948 paper [6] . In the process of communicating through a noisy channel, the receiver of the communication may be confused (due to the noise) as to which signal was actually transmitted. The goal of a reliable communication system is to remove the confusion. For the purpose of providing an intuitive illustration, Shannon considered the analog transmission of a random information signal over a noisy channel. The result is equivocation, in the English language sense of the word. Because of the noise, the receiver cannot uniquely identify the meaning of the information, which is the source sequence that was transmitted. Shannon quantified equivocation as the conditional entropy of the source sequence X n given the output of the channel Y n .
A communication system designed for secrecy will cause equivocation. It would seem that higher equivocation to an eavesdropper is good, and lower equivocation is bad, from the point of view of secrecy. That's certainly true for the extreme points. No equivocation means that the eavesdropper knows the information entirely, and maximal equivocation means that the eavesdropper did not learn another about the information. Consequently, equivocation has been adopted repeatedly as a measurement of partial secrecy. It is also a nice quantity to deal with for information theorists. In a variety of work, including for example [5] , the greatest possible equivocation is sought under the communication and secret key constraints.
Shannon referred extensively to equivocation in his landmark secrecy paper [1] . He outlined the properties of equivocation that make it an intuitive and useful quantity to deal with. However, the mathematical use of equivocation in his work served as an intermediate mechanism for determining how long a cipher can be used before it can be cracked with reasonable certainty. In his setting, the roughly linear relationship between the equivocation of the secret key and the length of the ciphertext made the analysis of equivocation a useful avenue to the results. The paper does not use equivocation as a metric of partial secrecy.
Equivocation is not a thoroughly motivated measurement for partial secrecy, but it does have some interesting consequences and properties. For example, equivocation of a message implies a lower bound on the size of a list that an eavesdropper can reliably limit the message to. If the eavesdropper has some other description of the information to supplement the intercepted transmission, he might be able to deduce the information in spite of the encryption, but the amount of additional information must be at least as great as the equivocation created by the encryption system. In the setting of [1] , the extra side information comes implicitly from the redundancy of the information source, and hence the ability to compress. For instance, if an eavesdropper is aware of a compression algorithm that is more efficient than the compression used by the encoder in an encryption system, then he can use this ability to rule out unlikely sequences from the information source. This would be like an eavesdropper intercepting a partially encrypted video sequence and decoding a (exponentially large) list of candidate videos. If the eavesdropper then painstakingly watches each video in the list, most will be ruled out as garbage. The redundancy of the source effectively provides side information to the eavesdropper.
Other approaches for measuring and maximizing partial secrecy have been explored. In the work of Merhav [7] , secrecy is measured by the probability that an eavesdropper can guess the message correctly. This uses large deviations analysis to evaluate and minimize that probability. Under perfect secrecy, the probability that an eavesdropper guesses an i.i.d. information sequence correctly goes exponentially to zero. In a different approach, Maurer [8] suggested a combination of computational and information theoretic secrecy. He proposed an encryption scheme that uses very little secret key and a very long public random sequence. The secret key . Node A and Node B are designed so that Node B can produce a sequence of actions Y n which depend on X n . The resources available to them are communication over a public channel at rate R bits per action and secret key (independent of X n ) at rate R0 bits per action. An adversary taps into the message sent over the public channel and observes the actions of the system and information sequence causally. The adversary attacks the system by minimizing a value function π(x, y, z), and the system is designed to maximize the worst case average value obtained.
selects parts of the random sequence to combine and use as a one-time pad. Assuming that the eavesdropper cannot reasonably explore all parts of the random sequence, a high probability event yields the message and the transmission conditionally independent. Thus, with an assumed computational limit, the system yields conditionally-perfect secrecy with high probability.
In this work, we avoid using equivocation as a measurement of secrecy.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In Figure 1 , a distributed system is represented by two components, Node A and Node B. A third node, Node C, represents a hypothetical adversary who attacks the system. An i.i.d. source of information {X i } ∞ i=1 is known to Node A. The distribution of each element of the sequence X i is given by the probability mass function p 0 (x).
Node B and Node C take actions in the system. A function π(x, y, z) represents the value obtained by the system during each time epoch when the information symbol X i is x, the action by the cooperating agent at Node B Y i is y, and the attack by the adversary Z i is z. The system is designed, with a block of length n in mind, to maximize the average value
while the adversary tries to minimize Π. One interpretation of π is as the payoff function of a zero-sum game between the distributed system and the adversary. The communication in the system is defined as follows. Node A sends a message to help Node B coordinate actions with the source sequence {X i } ∞ i=1 , but the message is available to both agents, Node B and Node C. However, a secret key (independent of the source sequence) is know only to Nodes A and B, which can be used to establish secrecy and coordination in the system. For example, if the secret key is large enough, the communication can be fully encrypted so that only Node B can make use of it.
An (R 0 , R, n) coordination scheme consists of an encoder and a decoder utilizing a secret key rate of R 0 bits per symbol and a description rate of R bits per symbol. The encoder at Node A transmits an nRbit message J ∈ [2 nR ] based on the source realization X n and an nR 0 -bit secret key K ∈ [2 nR0 ] which is independent of the source. The encoding at Node A can be designed to use randomization; thus, it is described by a conditional probability function p(j|x n , k).
The attack by the adversary (Node C) on the distributed system (Nodes A and B) occurs interactively. Nodes B and C first receive the communication produced by Node A. Then they each produce one action, Y 1 and Z 1 . This constitutes the first instance of the game, after which both nodes are aware of the action taken by the other node and the first symbol of the source realization X 1 . At this point they each choose a second action, Y 2 and Z 2 , and proceed in a similar manner. For each iteration of the game, the decoder at Node B generates an action Y k based on the message J, the secret key K, and the past actions X i−1 , Y i−1 , and Z i−1 . This decoder is described by a set of conditional probability distribution {p(y i |j, k,
. The adversary (Node C) also generates actions in a similar way as the coordinating agent (Node B), except that he doesn't have access to the secret key. His actions are described by a set of conditional probability distributions {p(z i |j,
. We consider the strategy of the eavesdropper that inflicts the most damage on the system. A (R 0 , R, n) coordination scheme is evaluated by the expected average payoff it assures against the worst-case adversary.
To summarize:
-Decoder (Node B):
• Adversary -Strategy (Node C):
• Joint Distribution: product of all of the above.
• Average Value:
• Robust achievable value:
A system may not be aware of an adversary or the actions an adversary has taken. There may be multiple adversaries attacking a system. This problem statement defines a decoder at Node B that responds to a single adversary. However, we will find that the optimal max-min codec does not take the actions of adversary into account, nor does it use the causal source information. Decoders at Node B of the form C B = {p(y i |j, k)} achieve optimality. Therefore, these results are more widely applicable than the specific setting described. They may also apply to situations where an adversary is not easily detected or multiple adversaries exist.
On the other hand, the causal information available to the adversary is crucial for these results. If the adversary had less information available, the system can achieve the same value using less resources. In the extreme case, if the adversary has no causal information of the actions at Node B or the information at Node A, then it is easy to transmit a message that is useless to the adversary. Any small rate of secret key is as good as perfect secrecy in the sense that the adversary cannot mount an attack based on the intercepted message. This is discussed further in Section VIII.
IV. MAIN RESULT

Theorem 4.1:
where
V. CONVERSE
Proof: In this section we prove an upper bound on Π p0 (R 0 , R). For any coordination scheme satisfying the rate constraints R 0 and R, we identify random variables X, Y , U , and V such that p(y, u, v|x) ∈ P p0 (R 0 , R) and
We first itentify the reandom variables for the converse. Let Q be a random variable uniformly distributed on the set [n] and independent of all other random variables in this discussion. We will use Q as a random index for sequences, where X Q is a function of the sequence X n and the variable Q that selects the Qth element of the sequence. Notice that for an i.i.d. sequence like X n , the random index Q is independent of X Q .
Identification of variables:
We start by noticing that X is distributed according to p 0 and X − (U, V ) − Y form a Markov chain, according to the definitions and properties above.
Next, we show the inequalities that involve R 0 and R.
Consequently, the variables X is distributed according to p 0 and the variables U , V , and Y are conditionally distributed according to p(y, u, v|x) ∈ P p0 (R 0 , R). Now consider that
VI. SKETCH OF ACHIEVABILITY
Proof: Here we design a system that guarantees an average expected reward approaching the value of Π p0 (R 0 , R) given in Theorem 4.1. This is done using the notions of empirical coordination and strong coordination discussed in [10] .
Begin with the optimal conditional distribution p(y, u, v|x) ∈ P p0 (R 0 , R). The main idea is to first specify a U n sequence that is empirically coordinated with X n , which is to say that it is jointly typical with high probability, using a communication rate of roughly R = I(X; U ). Then a sequence Y n is strongly coordinated with X n , conditioned on U n , which is to say that X n and Y n appear to be memoryless, even with full knowledge of the codebook used for coordination. The variable V is an auxiliary variable that only has meaning in the process of achieving strong coordination. The rates needed for strong coordination over a public channel are R 0 ≥ I(X, Y ; V |U ) and R ≥ I(X; V |U ), with the condition that X − (U, V ) − Y form a Markov chain. These rate requirements are touched on in [11] .
After encoding, the adversary knows the sequence U n . The other sequences in the system, X n and Y n , are correlated with U n , but otherwise appear to be nearly memoryless (in total variation), even conditioned on everything known by the adversary. Therefore, the best strategy for the adversary to minimize the average value to the system will not be much better than choosing the best strategy z(u) that minimizes E π(X, Y, z(U )) and applying this strategy during each iteration.
VII. SPECIAL CASES
A. Lossless
In some cases of π, the description of Π p0 (R 0 , R) simplifies. A particular important case is the lossless setting, where Y n is required to be equal to X n with high probability.
1 This is worth considering because it resembles the familiar setting usually considered for information theoretic secrecy, where the information source sequence X n must be recovered by the intended receiver.
In the lossless case, π can be though of as a distortion function that is being inflicted on an eavesdropper. The system is designed to maximize the distortion.
The following corollary is found in [12] and can be reduced to a linear program.
Corollary 7.1: For the lossless case, where Y n must equal X n with high probability, the robust average value is
B. No interaction
We can image some cases where Node B and the adversary each attempt to reconstruct the source X n with low distortion, and they are each not concerned with the reconstruction of the other. This situation can be expressed with two separate value functions π 1 (x, y) and π 2 (x, z). We might ask for two separate constraints to be satisfied or simply construct a value function π(x, y, z) that is the product or sum of these two separate components.
By removing the direct interaction between Node B and the adversary, it might seem that a simpler encoding scheme, not involving strong coordination, is optimal. Unfortunately, that is not the case. If the distortion constraint at Node B were achieved in a careless way, without using strong coordination, then the adversary would be able to infer extra information about X n indirectly through the observation of the past actions at Node B. This would help the adversary to reduce it's own distortion.
VIII. LIMITED ADVERSARY
The result expressed in Theorem 4.1 specify a guaranteed average value against an adversary who has causal information of all actions and information in the system. The results change significantly if the adversary is limited in the information available. Here we give three results related to the main result in Theorem 4.1, with proofs omitted.
Theorem 8.1: Consider an adversary who only has access to the message J and the past actions at Node B, but not the past information symbols. Thus, the strategies of the adversary are defined by {p(z i |j, y i−1 , z i−1 )} n i=1 .
Π p0 (R 0 , R) = max The third setting, in which the adversary has no causal information, is the approach taken by Yamamoto in [9] . We see from Theorem 8.3 that there is no non-trivial lower bound on the rate or secret key needed. In Theorem 3 of [9] a lower bound is provided, but after careful consideration and with the proper choice of auxiliary random variables, that bound can be shown to be zero.
In other work by Yamamoto [13] , R 0 is taken to be exactly zero. The results do not have the form of Theorem 8.3. Instead they coincide with Theorems 4.1, 8.1, and 8.2 with R 0 = 0. This illustrates a discontinuity of Π p0 (R 0 , R) at R 0 = 0.
